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Abstract
A. preeminent argument against efficiency wage theory as an explanation
of involuntary unemployment is that a Pareto superior incentive scheme
exists which can handle the worker shirking problem: workers could post
performance bonds which they forfeit in the event they are caught shirking.
The employer moral hazard problem that is created by the possibility of bond
expropriation is believed to be solvable by employer reputation. We show
that overcoming the employer moral hazard problem by reputation requires
extra-normal profits for the firms which in turn imply inefficiencies in the
product market rather than in the labor market. Moreover, if firms can
enter the product and labor markets freely, an equilibrium with extra-normal
profits cannot exist, unless firms have differentiated technical efficiency
characteristics. In the latter case, in the process of signalling their
types and, thus, establishing their reputations, firms have to follow cer-
tain employment paths and to incur costs which, in effect, work as entry
barriers and permit market equilibrium to exist. However, if the size of
the firm is not observable to workers, again no bonding equilibrium can
exist, but an equilibrium with efficiency wages is possible.

I. Introduction
Efficiency wage theory has recently become a popular means of explaining
equilibrium unemployment. In a very attractive version of this theory, it
is posited that employment relationships suffer from agency problems on the
part of workers. The problem of providing appropriate incentives for
workers coupled with the inability to perfectly monitor worker effort by
firms leads to employment contracts where workers are paid in excess of
their reservation wage, but fired if caught shirking. In equilibrium, such
contracts necessitate job rationing, giving rise to involuntary unemployment
[Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bulow and Summers, 1986; Yellen, 1984; Katz,
1986].
In spite of its attractiveness both for its relative simplicity and its
predictive power, efficiency wage theory has been severely attacked on the
grounds that there is a Pareto superior incentive scheme to handle the
worker shirking problem: workers could post performance bonds which they
forfeit in the event they are caught shirking [Akerlof and Yellen, 1986].
Moreover, an equilibrium with performance bonds is compatible with labor
market clearing. Thus, one might quite reasonably ask whether the involun-
tary unemployment associated with efficiency wage theory is merely an
artifact of incorrect modeling. [See the exchange between Carraichael (1985)
and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985).]
Advocates of the efficiency wage view have advanced several reasons why
the posting of performance bonds by workers may not be a feasible solution
to the agency problem. Among these explanations are liquidity constraints
faced by workers, worker reluctance to post performance bonds when there is
a risk of being mislabeled as a shirker, and employer moral hazard asso-
ciated with expropriation of performance bonds, perhaps through the
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deliberate mislabeling of workers as shirkers. The preeminent explanation
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among these appears to be liquidity constraints, though it is somewhat
disturbing to have a theory of labor market inefficiencies rely entirely on
such a deus ex machina . Similarly, noise in the monitoring of worker effort
may contribute to the lack of reliance on performance bonds, but it does not
seem to supply an explanation of sufficient weight to rule out performance
bonds entirely.
Employer moral hazard problems associated with the expropriation of
performance bonds would appear to offer a much more promising explanation
for the absence of such bonds in actuality, though it is not our primary aim
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to provide such an explanation. Instead, our goal is to first explicate
the role of firm reputations in sustaining an equilibrium with performance
bonds and, second, to address the conventional wisdom that when such an
equilibrium exists, it is indeed first best, since there will not be any
involuntary unemployment. Our view is that when workers are not liquidity
constrained, the use of performance bonds may imply labor market clearing,
but this does not in itself imply first best outcomes. When firm moral
hazard problems need to be overcome in order for workers to be willing to
post bonds, it should not be surprising that the resulting equilibrium is
not first best. However, one may have to consider phenomena other than
involuntary unemployment to observe the departure from the first best
solution.
The source of inefficiencies in our equilibrium is that firms require
some incentive to maintain their reputations. Firms need to earn sufficient
rents from their reputations that they view expropriation of performance
bonds, which causes'a loss of reputation, as unattractive. In our model,
such rents appear in the form of extra normal future profits.
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Our view of firm reputation in the labor market is similar in spirit to
some of the recent works concerning firm reputation and the provision of
quality in the product market [Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1982 and
1983), and Allen (1984)]. In particular, our analysis follows Allen's
fairly closely. When firm sales are observable by buyers, Allen finds that
equilibrium, should it exist, may entail rationing on the part of sellers.
That is, price may be in excess of marginal cost. The reason for this
rationing is that, were a firm to increase its sales, the firm's customers
would no longer find it credible that the firm is providing a high quality
product. In this event, these customers would shop elsewhere. In our
model, the analogous result is that employers will be rationed in hiring
workers, in order to convince the workforce they do employ that the per-
formance bonds will not be expropriated. Thus, in our equilibrium, the
marginal value product of labor will exceed the disutility of effort, as in
efficiency wage theory, though the labor market will clear.
An important issue with which the product quality literature has
grappled is how to reconcile: (i) the fact that firm reputation must
generate sufficient rents Co resolve the firm moral hazard problem, with
(ii) the notion of competitive equilibrium in the long run. Klein and
Leffler 's solution is to resort to nonprice competition in the form of
firm-specific nonsalvageable assets, such as firm logos, which facilitate
consumer service. Sunk capacity investment which raises the marginal
product of labor curve may serve the same function in the labor market.
Thus, the Klein and Leffler approach when applied to the employer moral
hazard problem suggests an alternative distortion with regard to factor mix,
i.e., firms maintain excess sunk capacity to sustain their reputations in
the labor market. Shapiro's (1983) solution is to assume entrants pay
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"reputation building fees" in the form of price discounts to their initial
customers. We find Shapiro's story quite compelling. However, his model
suffers from the criticism that there is nothing which distinguishes
established firms from entrants, other than the time of entry. There is no
theoretical reason in Shapiro's model why customers should be reluctant to
immediately buy from entrants at the price charged by established firms.
Allen's (1984) model is sounder from a game-theoretic perspective, but he is
forced to utilize sunk fixed costs to support his equilibrium. In the
perfectly contestable case, which we focus on, Allen's equilibrium does not
exist.
Our goal is to provide a solid theoretical foundation for Shapiro's
intuition and thereby to endogenously determine the equilibrium reputation-
building fees. In so doing, we borrow heavily from Milgrora and Roberts
(1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982). They show how Selten's chain store
paradox can be resolved by considering a model of incomplete information
where firm reputation is to be interpreted as a signal of firm type. This
view of firm reputation appears to be quite natural and in sharp contrast to
the view of reputation in the product quality literature, where firms are
intrinsically identical. The reputation-building fees are determined in a
signalling equilibrium as a means by which workers are convinced of the
firm's type, which in our model is in regard to a technological parameter.
Moreover, we obtain a very sharp characterization of the long run equi-
librium under some reasonably mild restrictions on the initial beliefs of
workers.
Heretofore, we have restricted attention to the case where workers can
observe the firm's employment level. Therefore, workers are in a position
to verify whether firms earn sufficient rents to deter them from
-5-
expropriation of performance bonds. But when workers do not have sufficient
information to make such calculations, they will not be willing to post
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performance bonds. Consequently, when firm employment levels are not
observable by workers, an equilibrium with performance bonds is not
viable. Thus, it must be the firms who "post the bonds" in this case.
This returns us to efficiency wage equilibrium. However, so long as some of
the workers' compensation is in the form of deferred payments, there is an
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additional wrinkle to consider. The employer moral hazard problem does not
disappear, but is now referred to as reneging on deferred obligations rather
than expropriation of performance bonds. Firms must still earn sufficient
rents from their reputations. Yet, when firm employment is not observable,
each firm will operate where the marginal value product of labor equals the
marginal cost per worker. This solution entails a firm scale which is too
large. In this case there is a second type of inefficiency apart from
involuntary unemployment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
lay out the basic structure of the model for a firm and its employees in the
spirit of the 'shirking' model developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). We
demonstrate the nature of the contractual equilibrium viewing the long term
contract as a repeated game, as in Bull (1987). We then show that with one
type of firm no product market equilibrium, whether firms utilize efficiency
wages or performance bonds, can exist. In Section III, we allow for a
continuum of firms with different production efficiencies and consider an
entry game where firms choose entry fees and their employment paths to
signal their types. The entry game is parameterized by the price in the
product market. We demonstrate the existence of a long run equilibrium
price such that only the most efficient type firm would choose to enter.
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Such a firm is indifferent to entering or not because the equilibrium entry
fee is just equal to the discounted present value of the extra normal
profits the firm would earn if it entered. Moreover, at the long run
equilibrium price, a firm with a reputation, i.e. a firm which has already
paid the entry fee, operates where the discounted present value of the
future profit stream just equals the value of the performance bonds posted
by the firm's workers. In this manner the model with a continuum of firm
types resolves the nonexistence problem of product market equilibrium
discussed in Section II. In Section IV, we provide a discussion of the
model when firm employment is not observable by workers. Section V offers
a brief conclusion and possible avenues for future research.
II. A Discrete Time Model of Efficiency
Wages and Performance Bonds
Consider an economy with three commodities: a produced good, a nonpro-
duced asset which also serves as a numeraire, and a labor-leisure asset.
There are two types of agents, workers and firms. Workers may be either
employed or unemployed, but are otherwise identical. Each worker is assumed
to be infinitely lived; to possess a one period, additively separable, von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which is linear in both numeraire and
leisure consumption; and to be endowed with one indivisible unit of labor-
leisure as well as with sufficient amounts of the numeraire that could be
posted as the requisite performance bond, should the worker choose to do so.
Let e denote worker effort. Employed workers can either shirk (e = 0) or
provide effort (e = e). Unemployed workers necessarily take leisure
(e = 0), and this conveys the same utility payoff as in case of shirking.
We normalize the utility function so that when a worker consumes y units of
numeraire and expends e units of effort, the utility payoff is y - e.
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In this section we restrict attention to the case where all firms
are technologically identical. Each firm has a production function, f,
whose sole argument is the effective labor input. When the workforce of the
firm is L and the proportion of the workforce which shirks is k, the output
of the firm is given by f[(l-k)L]. The function f is assumed to be dif-
ferentiable, nondecreasing, and to admit U-shaped average and marginal cost
curves (measured in effective labor units). In addition, assume the Inada
condition, linL f'(L) = 0, and the absence of any fixed costs, f(0) 0.
Firms are assumed to be price takers in the product market. The product
price is p.
The centerpiece of this section is the employment contract, to which we
now turn. Though a worker will typically be employed with a firm for quite
some duration, it will be convenient for expository purposes to view the
employment contract as a succession of one-period contracts. Such a
one-period contract is a triple, (w,B,L), where, should the contract be
acceptable to a sufficient number of workers, w is the wage rate to be paid
to each worker, B is the performance bond to be posted by each worker, and L
is the volume of employment. We will discuss the acceptability requirement
further on in this section. For now, simply assume that this requirement is
satisfied.
After a contract has been offered and accepted, each worker receives w
and posts B. Each worker then chooses to set e = e or e = 0, and produc-
tion takes place. Following the efficiency wage literature, we assume that
if a worker has chosen to shirk, then there is a probability, 0, that the
worker is detected by the firm. The firm learns about worker shirking at
the end of the production process, and then chooses H, the number of workers
whose performance bonds are to be expropriated. If 9kL < H, then all workers
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who were detected shirking lose their performance bonds. The probability
that any other worker loses his performance bond is (H-6kL)/(L-0kL). All
workers who do not lose their performance bonds get the bonds refunded at
the end of the period. Thus, the contract fulfillment issue is a two-sided
moral hazard problem. Following the product quality literature, we assume
that f[(l-k)L] and BH are observed and, thus, k and H are inferred by all
Q
workers in the labor force. Note that in choosing H, the firm bases this
choice on k, the proportion of shirkers in its workforce; but in choosing e,
a worker cannot base this choice on H, the number of workers whose perform-
ance bonds are expropriated. We assume that the detection of both the
worker and the firm moral hazards occur prior to the time when the next
period's contract is offered. Thus, future firm contract offers, worker
acceptance decisions, worker effort choices, and firm expropriation levels
can all be made contingent on the current values of k and H.
Our goal is to construct perfect equilibria of the repeated version of
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this contract game. In fact, we restrict attention to a subclass of these
equilibria characterized by two properties: (i) the equilibrium path is
stationary and (ii) the punishments for breach of contract are those which
have become popular in the efficiency wage and product quality
literatures. Thus, the punishment for a worker who is detected shirking
is first, forfeiture of performance bond and second, loss of the right of
first refusal to the firm's future contract offers, i.e., the worker is
fired. The punishment for a firm which has appropriated more performance
bonds than justifiable based on detected shirking, BH > OkBL, is first that
no worker will accept a future contract offer from this firm if the contract
requires net bonding of the worker, i.e., w - B less than the worker's
reservation wage, and second, that if a contract offer has been
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accepted, then each worker under contract will shirk.. In other words, if
the firm has expropriated any performance bonds, it must go out of business.
We will demonstrate that these forms of punishment are indeed credible.
Any such equilibrium takes the following form. Let the contract along
e e e
the equilibrium path be denoted by (w ,B ,L ). As long as the firm has not
,666
cheated in any previous period, the firm offers (w ,B ,L ) in the current
period. In this event, all workers who are offered the contract accept it.
Then all these workers select e = e and the firm sets H - 0, i.e., there is
neither shirking nor bond expropriation in equilibrium. To put the model
more in accord with the efficiency wage literature, in particular with
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we assume there is a probability, s, that a
worker will be separated from the firm for reasons other than shirking.
Those workers who were offered the contract in period t and were not
separated from the firm get a new offer of the same equilibrium contract in
e
period t + 1. There are (l-s)L such workers. The firm replaces the
separated workers by hiring new employees from the pool of unemployed
workers. There are sL new hires. Each new hire also receives the
equilibrium contract. Then the process repeats.
Workers can infer the fraction of the firm's workforce which has
shirked from its observed volumes of employment and output. It is assumed
that the firm will not be found in violation of its contract as long as the
volume of performance bonds appropriated is not greater than 8kBL. Thus, it
is optimal for the firm to appropriate the performance bond of any worker
caught shirking. It is also assumed that the firing of workers caught
shirking does not constitute a breach of contract by the firm, i.e. , fired
workers can be readily replaced from the pool of unemployed as long as the
firm has not otherwise committed a contract violation. When the equilibrium
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contract wage, net of effort costs, is in excess of the workers' reservation
wage, the firing of workers caught shirking constitutes the maximum credible
punishment that the firm can impose. It is sensible to assume that this is
the punishment which the firm utilizes.
We must show that driving the firm out of business is a credible
punishment of an employer who has expropriated any bonds. However, before
doing this, we consider the worker decision to shirk or not when an arbi-
trary contract (w,B,L) has been offered and accepted by L workers. It is
assumed that the firm will not expropriate any bonds in the current period,
and that in the next period the firm will return to the equilibrium con-
tract. To analyze this decision, consider the returns to worker effort as
an asset. The effort choice is made to maximize the value of this asset.
Let r denote both the market interest rate and the workers' rate of time
preference. Let V be the expected present value of the discounted utility
stream of a worker who is currently unemployed, and V_ the same for a worker
who is currently employed under the equilibrium contract. It is easy to see
that V = [(w-e) (l+r)+sV ]/(r+s). Then, the expected value of not shirking
b u
given the current contract, V , is given by
sV.. + (l-s)[RV +(1-R)V ]
/ 1 \ tf — u E U(1) V. = w - e +
N 1 + r '
where R is the probability of being retained by the firm if the worker is
g
not separated for reasons other than shirking. R = min{l,L / [ (1-s ) (l-9k)L]
}
That is, if firm size shrinks enough, then it is assumed that workers are
retained on a pro rata basis. Similarly, the expected value of shirking
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given the current contract, V , is given by
6 [V-(l+r)B] + (l-6)[sV +(l-s)(RV +(1-R)V )]
fi\ v U U E U
C I ) V = w +
S (1+r)
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Workers find it optimal to put forth effort as long as V >^ V . This
condition is called the no shirking condition (NSC) and is satisfied as long
as
(l-s)R(VE -Vu )
(3) e<6[B+ ^ ].
Thus, the expected capital loss from being caught shirking, both in terms of
forfeiture of the performance bond and in terms of the loss of the right to
be offered the equilibrium contract in the next period, must be as great as
the utility gain from taking leisure on-the-job.
We can now show that no operation by the firm is a perfect equilibrium.
Suppose that indeed along the equilibrium path the firm always offers a
contract which is never accepted by any worker. It follows that at any
arbitrary contract (w,B,L) which has been accepted and satisfies B > 0,
the firm should expropriate all the performance bonds, since in the sub-
sequent period the equilibrium path will be re-established, regardless of
how much bond is expropriated. Hence, even if the contract has been
accepted, the bond will have no incentive effect on the workers' effort
decision, since each worker will expect the firm to expropriate all the
bond. Moreover, there is no intrinsic value to being employed by the firm
because in all future periods the firm is out of business. Therefore, if
the contract has been accepted by workers, then each worker will shirk. It
follows that if offered such a contract, a worker will only accept it if
w - B
_> rV /(1+r), i.e., the payment to the worker net of the bond expro-
priation by the firm is in excess of the worker's reservation wage. But
since any worker who accepts such a contract will shirk, the firm cannot
make a profit by offering such a contract and, when V > 0, the firm makes a
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loss. Thus, it is optimal to offer a contract which all workers find
unacceptable.
Since the no trade equilibrium described above will be played once the
firm has expropriated any performance bonds, it is sufficient to consider
only the case of full expropriation in analyzing the firm's moral hazard
problem. Let the per period profit along the equilibrium path be denoted by
p p P P P
ttjtt = pf (L ) - w L . Suppose that the firm has offered an arbitrary
contract (w,B,L), and this contract has been accepted by L workers.
Moreover, suppose that if the firm does not expropriate the bonds in the
current period, then the equilibrium contract will be offered, accepted, and
fulfilled in all future periods. The firm will fulfill the current contract
if the present discounted value of the future profit stream is at least as
large as the value of the bonds which the firm could expropriate. This
condition is called the no expropriation condition (NEC) and is satisfied as
long as
(4) 7T
e
/r
_> (1-k.e )LB.
Any contract (w ,B ,L ) which satisfies the NSC, the NEC, V > V , and
E U
Q
tt >_ can be sustained as a subgame-perf ect equilibrium. Such equilibria
are sustained by workers punishing firms for offering out of equilibrium
contracts as well as for expropriating performance bonds. For a given
employment level, there may very well exist a family of equilibria, where
members of the family differ in the contract wage and performance bond
levels, so that greater performance bonds allow for lower efficiency wages
while still satisfying the NSC. Obviously, among these equilibria, workers'
preferences are opposed to those of firms. It is not our intention to
address the bargaining problem implicit in the question of equilibrium
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selection. Instead, we merely borrow the assumption from the efficiency
wage literature that a firm can extract all the rents from its workers,
reflecting the more basic assumption that labor markets are perfectly com-
petitive and therefore the firm's labor supply is perfectly elastic at the
reservation wage. We ask whether there are any rents accruing to workers
which are embodied in the contract wage, because equilibrium contracts must
reconcile the two incentive problems, even though workers are assumed to
have no bargaining power.
We address this question by supposing that the firm is only punished if
it has expropriated bond. That is, if the firm offers an out-of-equilibrium
contract, then the game proceeds henceforth under the assumption that the
firm goes unpunished as long as it does not expropriate the bonds in this
out-of-equilibrium contract. Call any such equilibrium a breach as
expropriation equilibrium (BEE). The main result of this section is that
there is an essentially unique BEE. The BEE is either the no trade
equilibrium or an equilibrium with full bonding, i.e., w = e + rV /(1+r)
and B >_ e/6 . In the latter case, the only source of non-uniqueness is that
redundant bonding is possible when the NEC is not binding. It is important
to note that a contract with efficiency wages cannot be a BEE.
e e e
Let (w ,B ,L ) be a BEE contract and suppose the firm has made an
arbitrary offer (w,B,L) which has been accepted by L workers. The firm does
not expropriate the bonds so long as the NEC is satisfied. Hence, all the L
workers who were offered the contract choose e = e as long as the NSC is
satisfied. When the contract (w,B,L) satisfies both the NSC and the NEC,
workers who are offered the contract accept it as long as
sV.. + (l-s)[RV +(1-R)V ]/r\ — U E U v „(5) w-e + j-— >v.
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Inequality (5) is termed the contract acceptability condition (CAC). The
firm will offer a contract which maximizes its profits in the current period
subject to the NSC, NEC, and CAC. It follows that in such a profit maxi-
mizing contract, the CAC must be binding. To see this observe that the
current wage payment does not enter into either the NSC or the NEC. Hence,
if the CAC were not binding, the firm could offer an alternative contract
which differed from the profit maximizing contract only in that the alterna-
tive one had a lower wage, and hence a higher profit. Obviously, such an
alternative contract cannot exist.
Since the CAC is binding and the left hand side of (5) is V as defined
in (1), it follows that V = V . But in a stationary equilibrium V = V .
Hence, the equilibrium contract must be a full bonding one.
The reader may be uncomfortable with this result because it is based on
the assumption that the firm cannot precommit to a contract path. Indeed,
the objection might be raised that the period in which detection of the
moral hazard occurs is not coincident with the period in which a new
contract offer from the firm is forthcoming. We concur with this objection,
viewing it likely that the latter is substantially longer than the former.
But the conclusion that equilibrium contracts require full bonding is robust
to letting firms have some degree of precoramitment in their future contract
offerings, though the argument explaining why this is true is different from
the intertemporal wage discrimination argument we gave in the no precornmit-
ment case.
A straightforward way to understand this other argument is to grant the
firm the ability to precommit to the same contract in all periods and assume
these precommitted to contracts will be in force as long as the firm has not
cheated. Call such an equilibrium a precommitted breach as expropriation
equilibrium (PBEE). Then the PBEE NSC is
-15-
e r + s e — r r+se
(6) w + f B > e + . , VI7 + T-.vy 1-s — 1 + rU l-s6
e 13
The PBEE NEC, assuming L > 0, is
(7) Rllp..^ - rBe > o.
L
e
Suppose the firm is offering an equilibrium contract which has some
degree of efficiency wage payment in it. It follows that (6) and (7) must
both be binding. But along the NSC constraint, dw /dB - -(r+s)/(l-s).
Therefore, holding employment constant, the firm could change its contract
e e
offer along the NSC constraint by raising B and lowering w . Such a move
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slackens the NEC as longs as s > 0, and has no impact when s = 0. Thus
such a move increases profits, because labor costs have been reduced.
When there is employment in the PBEE equilibrium, the PBEE employment
level either solves
rVU
(8) max pf(L) - [7+ t~]L,
LX>
in which case (7) is not binding, or is implicitly given by
(9) P
f(L ) -T, L. + _^ }
T
e
e +
1 + r 9'
Li
Let L be the input level where maximum average product is obtained. If
pf(L)/L < e + rV /(1+r) + re/0 , then the PBEE is necessarily the no trade
equilibrium.
We conclude this section by observing that this view of worker-firm
contracting is incompatible with product market equilibrium under free
entry. There is no value of p for which there is a PBEE with the firm in
operation, yet earning zero profit. We attempt to resolve this dilemma in
the next two sections.
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III. A Model of Entry with a Continuum of
Different Firm Types
In this section, we expand the above basic model by allowing for
differentiated firms and by assuming that workers cannot observe the type of
a given firm. As a result of this information asymmetry, workers cannot
verify directly whether a particular firm's contract satisfies the NEC or
not. In the equilibrium which is described below, firms signal their types
by choosing both an endogenously determined entry fee, which is an increas-
ing function of initial employment, and by pursuing a particular employment
path over time. Both choices can be interpreted as acts of reputation
building. Consistent with this interpretation, a firm has a reputation if
it has paid the entry fee and employed workers for a sufficient number of
periods that its type is uniquely identified.
Let ra £ [m_,l] denote the firm type, with m_ > 0. m refers to a tech-
nological parameter which, for simplicity, we take to be a multiplicative
factor, so that mf is the production function of a type m firm. It is
assumed that no firm can impose punishment on any other firm. Only workers
can punish a firm for expropriation of performance bonds and this is
accomplished, as discussed in Section II, by refusing to work for this firm
in all periods subsequent to the time of bond expropriation. Thus, the BEE
contracts described in the previous section may not be sustainable. A type
a firm might find it more profitable to offer the BEE contract of a type m
firm for one period, expropriate the performance bonds, and go out of busi-
ness than to offer the BEE contract for a type m firm. As a result of this
problem, the type m firm will attempt to make its contract unattractive for
the purpose of bond expropriation by other type firms. It does this by
judiciously choosing its entry fee and employment path. In the process of
deterring other firms from bond expropriation, the firm signals its type.
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Without loss of generality, we restrict attention to full bonding
contracts. Any contract which calls for workers to be paid in excess of
their reservation wage plus effort costs in some periods could be replaced
by a full bonding contract with the same employment levels, where the
present discounted value of the wage premia are loaded into the entry fee.
This alternate full bonding contract provides the firm with identical
profits, and if the original contract deterred other firms from expropriat-
ing performance bonds, then the alternate contract would do so as well.
In the game that we consider here, each firm attempts to convince its
workers that there is no risk of bond expropriation. The equilibria of the
game have the properties that no firm has any incentive to expropriate
performance bonds and no firm desires to change its contract offer, given
the contract offers of the other firms. In order to center in on these
properties, we assume that firm strategies are in regard to contract offers
only. The firm decision to expropriate performance bonds or not as well as
the worker decisions to accept or reject the contract offer and to shirk or
put forth effort are all modeled implicitly through specification of the
payoff functions of the game. Denote a strategy for a type m firm by
o(m) = [C(m),{L (m)} ] , where C(m) is an entry fee, {L (m)} is a sequence of
employment levels, and L (m) is the employment level t - 1 periods after
entry has occurred.
The reader will note that a (m) is an open loop strategy. This obser-
vation bears some comment, since it is reasonable to ask whether closed loop
strategies would be more appropriate. We think not, on the grounds that the
added complication would provide little insight and would take us far afield
of our main purpose. The only source of strategic interaction between firms
is through the convincing of workers that a particular contract offer does
-18-
not involve any expropriation risk. Workers are so convinced when it is not
optimal for any type firm to offer the contract with the intent of bond
expropriation. If workers are able to accurately assess the equilibrium
payoffs for each firm type, they can determine whether a particular contract
offer involves expropriation risk. The essential difference in this regard
between open loop equilibria and closed loop equilibria is that, with the
former the workers' assessments of the equilibrium payoffs for each firm are
independent of the actual play of the game, while with the latter the
workers' assessments may vary with the history of play.
As already mentioned, our equilibria have the property that there is no
expropriation risk involved in accepting equilibrium contracts. It is
conceivable, however, that workers will accept a contract with expropriation
risk if they are paid a compensating differential to offset the expected
capital loss due to bond expropriation. We rule out equilibria with such
compensating differentials by restricting workers' prior beliefs over firm
types. Each worker's initial beliefs over firm types can be represented by
a probability distribution on the interval [m_,l]. These distributions may
vary across workers, but each distribution is required to be nonatomic and
with support equal to the entire interval [m_,l]. The consequence of this
restriction on worker beliefs is as follows. If there is any perception of
expropriation risk, then all workers will in fact expect expropriation with
certainty. Then the performance bonds will not deter worker shirking and
the requisite compensating differential to make the contract acceptable to
workers is too large to be economic from the point of view of the firm. The
payoff function defined in the next paragraph is constructed with this
restriction in mind.
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Let w = e + rV /(1+r), B = e/6 , and
R U F
00 pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
ir(m,a(m)) - £ - —, R t C(m).
t=l (l+r)
C
ir(m,a(m)) is the present discounted value of profits for a type m firm from
pursuing the strategy a (m) if that strategy is acceptable. Let the joint
18
strategy for all firm types be denoted by a,
a = X a(m).
me [in , 1 ]
The payoff function, denoted by u, maps firm types and joint strategies into
profits. The payoff function is defined by
(8) u(m,a) = it (m,a (ra)) if for all me [m,l] and for all t = 1,2,3,...
t pmf (I^Gn)) - w
R
L
h
(m) B
p
L (m)
Z r—
j
+ r-r ~ C(m)
h=l (1+r) (1+r)
_< max[ir (m,o(m) ) ,tt (m,o(m) ) ]
,
u(m,a) = otherwise.
The constraints in (8) say that no other type of firm m prefers to
select the strategy a(m) for the purpose of bond expropriation over select-
ing the strategy o(m). Note that when Tr(m,a(m))
_> Tr(m,a(m)), these
constraints reduce to
pmf (L (m)) - w L (m)
(9) B L (m) < L [ 5 —-5-2 ],
F
' ~ h»t+l (l+r) h_t
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for all t. This is the NEC for a type m firm playing strategy a(m). Thus,
workers do not fear the threat of expropriation by type m firms if such
firms would prefer to pursue a (m) in its entirety rather than to pursue
a (m) only for a finite number of periods and then expropriate the bonds.
Though the equilibria of this game will have the property that
Tr(m,cr(m))
_> it (m,a (m)) , there is still a reason for leaving the right hand
side of (8) as it is rather than putting Tr(m,a(m)) there instead. This
reason is illustrated by assuming instead that this alteration has been made
and that Tr(l,a(l)) = 0. Then, since the left hand side of (8) is
nondecreasing in m, by taking t large enough in (8) it is straightforward to
show that satisfaction of (8) requires that ir(m,a(m))
_< for all m e [m_,l].
Thus, a trivial equilibrium with no firm in operation always exists in this
case. Our specification of (8) rules out these trivial equilibria as is
shown by Lemma 1 below.
Given the payoff functions, Nash equilibrium is defined in the usual
19
way. In such a Nash equilibrium there is a critical firm type, ra , such
that for all m > m , type m firms earn strictly positive profits in
c
equilibrium and for all m < m , type m firms do not operate and hence earn
zero profits in equilibrium. We wish to rule out the case where m = m.
c —
In order to do so we assume
pmf(L) nfCl^
(10) £== wD < rB while ^^- - wd > rB p .
L K t l K — t
In other words, the least efficient type firm cannot satisfy the NEC while
the most efficient type firm can satisfy the NEC if it offers a stationary
employment contract at the employment level which maximizes average product,
or equivalently
,
profits per worker employed in the firm. m is then deter-
c
mined by
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Pm
c
f(L)
n
rB
F +
W
R
(11) = w = rB or m = =
L R F c pf(L)/L
Lemma 1 : Consider the strategy a = (C,{L }) where C = (l+r)B L and
—
—
—~~
—
t r
L = L for all t. If m > (rB T7+wn )L/[pf (L)] , thent r R
pmf (L) - w L - pmf (L ) - w L
B„L = Bj < — = I
F C F r
h«t+l (l+r)^
'
and
<» pmf (L ) - w L
(l±£)[ pmf (L)-(w +rB )L] = E t
r ,
~ C > 0.
r R F
t=l (l+r)*1
"1
While if m < (rB
F
"Hw
R
)L/[pf (L~) ] , then
pmf(L
1
) + (Bp-w^I^ - C = pmf(L) + (B
p
-w
R
)L - (l+r)B
p
L <
and
t pmf (L
h
) - w
R
L
h
B
p
L
t
u\ r, xh-1 , vt-1 Lh=l (1+r) (1+r)
t B L
=
(1+r)
"_i [pmf (L)-wR L] +
*—
—
- (i+r ) B L <
rCl+r)* 1 (l+r) 11 X F
for all t = 2,3,....
Proof: Trivial.
Lemma 1 implies that m jC (rB +w )L/[pf (L) ] , since for any
m > (rB +w )L/ [pf (L) ] , a type m firm could always choose a, satisfy the
r K
constraints in (8), and make positive profits. On the other hand,
m < (rB +w )L/[pf(L)] is not possible since satisfaction of (9) is not
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possible for any contract with positive employment when m < (rB +w )L/[pf(L)]
r R
This result is proven in Lemma 3.
We turn now to the consideration of the best response functions for
firms of type m^ m . From (8) it follows that these best responses depend
on other firms' strategies only insofar as these strategies determine firm
profits. Let L* maximize the per-period profit for the most efficient type
firm; i.e., pf(L*) = w_. Let z: [m,l] [0,(pf (L*)-w_L*)(l+r)/r] be such
K ~~ R
that z(m) = for ra < m , z is continuous, and z is nondecreasing. (In fact,
— c
we can take z to be convex as shown by Lemma 3 below. ) z assigns profits to
firm types. Note that we require profits assigned to type m firms for
m e [m_,m ) to be equal to zero. Such firms earn zero profit by not par-
ticipating. Moreover, the left hand side of (8) is increasing in m. Since
we require z(m ) = 0, satisfaction of (8) for m = m implies satisfaction
of (8) for m = m with m < m .
c
For m e [m ,1], a type m firm solves the following problem:
(12) maximize Tr(m,a(m))
a(m)
subject to:
for all t = 1,2,3,... and me [m_,l],
t pmf(L
h
(m)) - w
R
L
h
(m) B L (m)
£ r—-s + —\ C(m)
_< max[z(m) ,TT(m,a(m) ) ]
.
h=l (1+r) (1+r)
Lemma 2: There exists a solution to (12) for each me [ra ,1].
c
Proof : The proofs of Lemma 2 and all the remaining propositions in the
paper are provided in the Appendix.
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Let a*(m,z) denote a solution to (12) and let p(m,z) = tt (m,a*(m,z )
)
for me [m ,1 ]
•
c
Lemma 3 : p(m,z) is increasing and convex in m, and p(m ,z) = 0.
We are now ready to prove existence of Nash equilibrium for the entry
game. Our emphasis on the properties of the best response payoff function
p rather than on the best response correspondence itself stems from the fact
that the constraint set in (12) may not be convex and hence the optimum
correspondence need not be convex valued. We can nevertheless demonstrate
the existence of a profit assignment function, z*, such that p(m,z*) = z*(m)
for me [m ,1]« Any best response to z* will then yield a Nash equilibrium
c
of the game.
Theorem 1 : There exists a profit assignment function z* such that
p(m,z*) = z*(m) for m e [m ,1].
c
Henceforth let a* denote a Nash equilibrium. We show that a* is char-
acterized by two properties. First, among those types that enter, a*
separates types. That is, a*(m) * a*(m) for m, m > m and m # m. Second,
— c
let L*(m) denote the BEE employment level of a type m firm. Then either
there exists T(m,o*(m)) such that L *(m) = L*(m) for t > T(m,a*(m)), or
L *(m) < L*(m) for all t and lim L *(m) = L*(m). We shall refer to o*(m)
t t*00 t
in the former case as a reputation building strategy and in the latter case
as an asymptotic reputation building strategy.
Let the strategy constructed from o(m) but stationary from period T
T T T T
onwards be given by a ( m ) = [C (o(m)), {L (o(m))}], where C (a(m)) = C(m) ,
T T\ (o(m)) = L (m) for t = 1,...,T-1, and L (cr(m)) - L_(m) for t > T.
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Lemma 4 : Let z* be the profit assignment function associated with a*. That
is, z*(m) = n(m,a*(m)) for m e [m ,1] and z*(m) = for m e [m,m ). Then,
c — c
T
given z*, a* (m) satisfies (12i) and (12ii) for each T and for every
me [m , 1 ] •
c
Lemma 5: L *(m) < L*(m) for each t and for every me [m ,1].
t — c
Note : It follows from Lemmas 4 and 5 that either a*(m) is a reputation build-
ing strategy or L *(m) < L*(m) for each t.
We characterize the Nash equilibria in theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 2: If m,ra e [m ,1] and m * m, then a*(m) * a*(m).
c
Theorem 2 says that among these types that do enter, the equilibrium
separates types.
Theorem 3 : Suppose m < m
_< 1. If a*(m) is not reputation building,
then o*(m) is asymptotic reputation building.
Having shown existence of Nash equilibrium in Theorem 1 and having
characterized such equilibria in Theorems 2 and 3, we feel that it is
appropriate to designate the situation where m = 1 as the long run. In
this case, the only type of firm which can successfully enter is the most
efficient one, and such a firm is indifferent to enter or not. Note that
the strategy o is optimal for a type m firm so that in the long run entry
can be interpreted as requiring the payment of an entry fee equal to
B
p
L(l+r)/r whereupon firm reputation is immediately established. The long
run equilibrium price is p* = (rB +w )L/f(L), which clearly exceeds the
F R
social unit cost of production when there is no agency problem in the labor
market, i.e., w L/f(L).
R
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Note that so far we have considered V —and, therefore,
w = e + rV /(1+r)—as parameters. It is certainly correct to take V
R U U
fixed in analyzing the equilibrium of an individual firm or of a small
sector of an economy. However, in analyzing the equilibrium of the economy
as a whole, the expected present value of a currently unemployed worker's
utility is endogenous, determined by the job opportunities and wage rates
offered in the economy. To see how V is set in the long run equilibrium,
assume that there are N workers in the economy and that M firms satisfy the
aggregate demand for the product at price p*. If total employment, ML,
is less than N, then ML - N workers will be voluntarily unemployed and
indifferent between taking a job or not. In this case, V. = 0, indepen-
dently of equilibrium price and employment, and w - e. However, if
K.
ML = N, then output supply is restricted to (N/L)f(L), and the product
price has to be high enough to equilibrate the supply and demand in the
product market. The wage rate may also have to be higher to equate the
demand for labor to N. Thus, the wage rate may be higher than the disutil-
ity of effort, in which case all workers strictly prefer to be employed than
to taking leisure off the job. Since in such an equilibrium everyone is
employed, the reservation wage of workers is equal to their market wage rate,
p*f(L)/L - rB_, which exceeds their disutility of effort. Therefore, VTT
r U
in this case is equal to [p*f(L)/L - rB - e](l+r)/r.
F
Note that when s = and V = 0, the long run equilibrium price in this
bonding equilibrium coincides with the long run equilibrium price obtained
in a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage equilibrium and in both models firms
operate at L. In this case the efficiency wage and bonding equilibria are
Pareto equivalent, abstracting from any consideration of income distri-
bution. When s > 0, the long run price in the efficiency wage equilibrium
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will be higher than the corresponding price in the bonding equilibrium for
two reasons. First, in the presence of turnover, the efficiency wage has to
rise to compensate for the shortened expected employment horizon (see note
14). Second, turnover provides the possibility of reemployment for unem-
ployed workers, thus raising V in an efficiency wage equilibrium where
workers are involuntarily unemployed.
IV. The Model When Employment Is Unobservable
In this section, workers are taken to be unable to observe firm employ-
ment. The consequence of this assumption is that performance bonds are
ruled out entirely, because if workers were willing to post performance
bonds, then a firm could operate for one period at an arbitrarily large
scale with the sole intention of expropriating the bonds. Obviously, this
cannot occur in equilibrium. As a result, either firms must pay efficiency
wages or firms, rather than workers, must "post the bonds" in equilibrium
contracts. Efficiency wage contracts represent a perfect equilibrium in
this case, because if production with efficiency wages is profitable in one
period, it will be profitable in all periods and, therefore, employed
workers can rationally expect a future stream of premiums over their reser-
vation wages as long as they are not separated from the firm.
Bond posting by firms differs from efficiency wage contracts in that it
20involves a form of deferred payments to workers (see note 6). This re-
introduces the employer moral hazard problem which needs to be overcome by
mechanisms such as the one analyzed in Section II. For simplicity, let us
restrict contracts to be of the following form, (w,S), where w is the con-
tract wage and S is a severance payment made only in the event that the
worker is separated for reasons other than shirking. The severance payment
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is received by the worker in the period subsequent to separation. Then
(l+r)(w-¥) + s(S+V )
V = — , and the NSC is
E r+s
sCs+Vy) + (i-s)v
£
ev
u
+ (l-eXsCs+Vy) + (i-s)v
£ }
(13) w - e + ^ > w + 1+r
Substituting in for V yields
(14) [^2. + i-s]! + r^~s) Vy < sS + (l-s)w.
Firms will offer contracts where (14) binds. Then substituting s back into
V results in
- 7 vu
(15) Vc.=w-e+J- +E 9 l+r
Among those contracts where the NSC binds, V is increasing in w. Thus, the
firm has an incentive to load the bond into the severance payment in order
to extract rents from its workers. On the other hand, it is necessary that
S + V
_<_
V
, to avoid excessive turnover. This quit moral hazard constraint
restricts the firm's ability to extract rents from its workers. In an opti-
mal contract both the NSC and the quit moral hazard constraint bind, yield-
ing optimal contract values
(16) we = "e~ + ~- V
ri
+ ~, and
l+r U 8
S
e
= (l+r)|-.
Note that it is optimal for the firm to post the full bond, e/8 , for the
worker. Interest on this bond, re/8, is paid as part of the contract wage
as long as the worker is employed by the firm. The reason for doing this
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is that were the interest on the bond not paid to the worker, the worker
would be better off quitting and getting hold of the severance payment as
soon as possible. Note further that in the equilibrium with severance
payments V - V = (l+r)e/8 . Thus, the case of performance bonds posted by
firms does not preclude involuntary unemployment though, at fixed V , the
wedge between V and V will be less than in the case where efficiency wages
are used exclusively. In the latter case, this edge is given by
V-. - V„ = (l+r)e/ [9 (1-s)] . The reason for this difference is as follows.
E, U
Current wage payments as well as all past wage payments have no incentive
effects on the workers' effort decision, and in this sense can be thought of
as sunk costs. By deferring some of the workers' compensation, the sunk
costs associated with a worker who is separated in period t are less than
the analogous sunk costs incurred when efficiency wages are utilized.
A type m firm which plans to honor its contract involving severance
payments will choose the employment level to solve
e e
(17) maximize pmf(L) - [w +sS /(l+r)]L.
L>0
At an interior solution of this maximization problem, the first order
necessary condition is
(18) pmf '(L) = w
e
+ sS
e /(l+r).
A firm could go out of business to renege on its severance payment
obligations. In order for contract fulfillment to be optimal, it is
u
21
necessary that
(19) pmf(L)/L - [we +sSe /(l+r)] > sS G [ r/ ( 1+r ) ]
,
or
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(19') pmf (L)/L >_ w
e
+ sS
e
.
This condition is the analogue of the no expropriation condition in the case
of observable employment. Note that when firm employment is not observable,
aggregate shirking, and therefore the firm's reneging on its severance
payment obligations, cannot be inferred from the observed output level as it
was assumed possible in Section III. In this case, we assume that a firm's
breach of contract becomes known to all workers in the economy by "word-of-
mouth."
By subtracting (18) from (19') one obtains
(20) pm[f(L)/L-f »(L)] >_ sS
6 [r/(l+r) ]
.
In the equilibrium of the entry game, all firms which enter pay the same
22
entry fee, C. This entry fee equals the profits obtained from in and out
entry by the least efficient firm which enters. That is,
(21) C = pm f(L(m )) - weL( m ),
c c c
where m denotes the type of the least efficient firm which enters and
c
L(m ) solves (17) for m = m . m is implicitly determined where (19')
c c c
holds as an equality for m = m and L = L(m ).
c c
As in the previous section, we define the long run equilibrium price to
be determined where m = 1. We note that (18) requires L > L. Thus, in
c
this equilibrium there are two distinct sources of inefficiency. First,
there is involuntary unemployment since workers are paid in excess of their
reservation wage. Second, firm scale is too large since the left hand side
of (20) is necessarily positive. This second type of distortion does not
appear to have received much attention in the literature. Its macroeconoraic
implications certainly warrant further investigation.
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V. Conclusion
Efficiency wage theory has been developed to help explain involuntary
unemployment. This theory can be seen as a step towards construction of a
microfoundation for Keynesian macroeconomics. The implications of ef-
ficiency wage theory not only may justify the use of traditional macro-
economic policy instruments, but may also call for other types of policy
intervention targeted more specifically at resolution of the relevant
microeconomic problems. For example, wage subsidies financed by lump-sum
taxes are an effective type of intervention in an economy where an
efficiency wage equilibrium prevails, because such subsidies can raise the
value of employment to the workers and, thus, reduce the need for unemploy-
ment as a worker discipline device.
Performance bonds are an alternate means of handling the worker moral
hazard problem arising from imperfections in effort observability, which is
the basis for efficiency wage theory. In actuality, employment contracts
seem to be a hybrid of efficiency wage and implicit bonding which is observed
in the form of upward sloping wage profiles steeper than worker productivity
profiles (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Lazear and Moore, 1984). The use of
performance bonds, however, creates its own problem of employer moral hazard.
Employer reputations can overcome this moral hazard problem when the market
provides firms with sufficient rents from their reputations as honest
employers. In this paper, we have shown that such rents can be reconciled
with the free entry condition in competitive markets if firms pay entry fees
and follow employment paths which signal their unobservable characteristics.
However, the fact that there has to be rents to maintain the bonding
equilibrium implies that product prices have to be higher than the marginal
production costs. Though there is no involuntary unemployment in the-
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bonding equilibrium, this wedge is indicative of a product market distor-
tion. Note that even when worker-posted bonds are circumscribed by unobser-
vability of firm size, employer reputation is necessary as long as a part of
workers' compensation takes the form of deferred payments, such as severance
payments or pension plans. Thus, even in the absence of explicit bonding,
reputation rents may exist in equilibrium, and consequently product market
distortions will result.
Firm entry fees in bonding or deferred payment equilibria can be seen as
a reputation-building investment to which reputation rents are attributed as
normal profits. When the size of the firm is observable, a natural way of
making such an investment is to pay signing bonuses to the workers employed
in the period of entry. When the size of the firm is not observable, this
kind of investment is not viable. Hence, entry fees will appear in many
disparate forms, such as payments to third parties. The role of such
expenditures is to convince workers about the firm's characteristics and
incentives. This role is very similar to the role ascribed to advertising
in signalling product quality in markets where product quality cannot be
observed at the time of purchase. [Klein and Leffler, 1981; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986]. As such, it constitutes an alternative explanation of
uninformative advertising itself.
Existence of public information regarding workers' employment history
can give rise to worker reputations. This may increase the cost of shirk-
ing for workers and partially mitigate the worker moral hazard problem.
However, workers must still be provided with incentives to prefer their
reputations as conscientious workers to the short term benefits of shirking.
As in the case of employer reputation, worker reputation cannot remove the
unobservability distortion altogether.
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The bonding equilibrium we have described is charaterized by underem-
ployment, when there are some workers not under contract to any firm. That
is, more demand could be satisfied at a lower price if it were not necessary
that firms earn rents to sustain their reputations. In this case, just as
in the case of efficiency wage equilibrium, policy intervention may be use-
ful to attain Pareto improvements. In particular, demand subsidies can help
raise production and employment to their optimal levels. However, there may
be certain policies relevant to addressing the underemployment in bonding
equilibrium which are irrelevant to addressing this problem in efficiency
wage equilibrium, owing to the respective presence or absence of the
employer moral hazard problem. One such policy is the imposition of legal
penalties to discourage bankruptcy, thereby making it more costly for firms
to expropriate performance bonds.
We conclude by calling attention to the observation that reputation may
be but one mechanism to resolve the worker and firm moral hazard problems.
We suspect that there are a multitude of formal and informal labor market
institutions which address such problems. We also suspect that the con-
comitant distortions are manifested in a variety of ways. Comparing the
relative efficiencies of such institutions in dealing with the moral hazard
problems of the labor market is certainly quite a worthwhile line of
research.
-33-
Notes
The fact that actual labor contracts rarely call for the explicit
posting of performance bonds would appear to supply the efficiency wage
theory advocates with some rather potent ammunition.
2Studies of the implications of credit constraints can be found in Eaton
and white (1982) and Akerlof and Katz (1986).
3
It has been argued that, at least when capital markets are perfect, the
employer moral hazard problem associated with bond expropriation can be over-
come by using third party repositories for holding the performance bonds and
by designating parties other than the firm as the recipients of forfeited
performance bonds, when the firm fires workers for shirking. [Again, see
Carmichael (1985).] In other words, the firm has no incentive to deliber-
ately mislabel workers as shirkers, since it does not profit when these
workers are fired. Our view is that such schemes may indeed raise the cost
of bond expropriation to the firm, but do not rule out the incentives for
bond expropriation entirely. For example, under Carmichael' s scheme the
firm could credibly threaten a worker with dismissal unless the firm receives
some side payment from the worker. This extortion threat is analagous to
the threat of bond expropriation. Alternatively, the firm could collude
with the recipients of forfeited performance bonds and thereby find it
profitable to deliberately mislabel workers as shirkers. A third possibil-
ity, when the firm is not the recipient of forfeited performance bonds, is
that it is the workers who collude with these recipients, in order to defeat
the incentives ascribed to performance bonds in the first place.
In this paper we ignore the possibility of contracts with third parties
to rule out the added complication that the analysis of such contracts
entails. We note that to the extent that bonding is implicit (see note 6),
this restriction to bilateral contracts does not appear to be at odds with
actual labor contracts.
4
It is this worker inability to compute firm rents, because of inade-
quate information, which we feel to be the best explanation for the absence
of performance bonds in actuality.
The recent literature on implicit contracts with asymmetric information
suggests strongly that workers may have inadequate information to compute
firm rents even when firm employment is observable. See Hart (1983) for a
survey of this literature. Indeed, this idea may provide an interesting way
to connect the implicit contracts under asymmetric information and ef-
ficiency wage literatures.
6
With efficiency wages, it is not the compensation today that deters
workers from shirking today, but rather rents embedded in the future
compensation scheme which acts as an incentive device to motivate workers to
put forth effort today. These rents could equally well be embedded in
pension, severance, or deferred wage payments. Moreover, when retirement is
introduced into the model, some minimum level of deferred compensation is
necessary to resolve the worker moral hazard just prior to the date of
retirement.
-34-
If the contract is not acceptable to a sufficient number of workers
then it is null and void. In this case the firm must wait till the next
period to offer a new contract but any worker who accepted the contract is
free to seek employment elsewhere in the current period.
Q
In fact, we assume that the firm does not use the observation of
f[(l-k)L] in the detection of individual worker shirking. This assumption
is reasonable for small values of k, but breaks down for k near 1.
Obviously, when k=l the firm can infer from observation of its output that
essentially all of its workforce shirked. In the equilibrium described
below k=0 and such a problem does not arise.
9
Actually, we do not have well defined subgames here because the firm's
information set about a worker that has not been detected shirking contains
two nodes. That is, the firm can't distinguish between a worker who has put
forth effort and a worker who shirked but was -not detected. But since the
firm is never able to make this distinction in future periods, it acts as if
all such workers have a clean slate. Thus, what we really mean is that we
wish to construct perfect equilibria of this game-form.
For a more general analysis of subgame perfect equilibria in a similar
contract game, see MacLeod and Malcorason (1987). Their model differs from
ours in several respects. Among these are: (i) they assume detection
occurs with certainty, (ii) they assume that production is additively sepa-
rable in the labor input, and (iii) they ignore the possibility of turnover.
The most important difference, however, is that they allow for the possibility
of a perfectly enforceable severance tax, to deter workers from shirking and
then being fired. In the presence of labor turnover for reasons other than
shirking, it is hard to imagine that workers would agree beforehand to such
a severance tax. It is also hard to believe that such taxes are enforce-
able ex post if these taxes exceed the amount that the worker has already
paid into a severance fund.
The reader will note that we are using the "Strong Law of Large Numbers"
applied to the continuum when we conclude that 8kL is the number of workers
who are detected shirking. As has been pointed out by Feldman and Gilles
(1985) among others, this is not valid, in general. They offer several
suggestions to remedy this problem. For the purpose of our paper we adopt
their second remedy, which is to weaken the independence condition. That
is, the condition that the random variable denoting worker 3 being detected
shirking is independent of the random variable denoting worker 8' being
detected shirking. Under the assumption that a worker can't observe the
decision to shirk or not by other workers before he faces this decision him-
self, this remedy does not appear to create any difficulties for our paper.
12
Note that we assume being detected shirking and being separated for
reasons other than shirking are independent events. We also assume that
when the intersection of these events occurs, the worker is treated as a
shirker. Because this intersection has nonzero probability, our asset
equations appear somewhat different than the analogous conditions in
continuous time formulations, such as those given by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984).
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13
When the firm has a precommitment capability, it may be reasonable for
the punishment to be milder than having to resort to the no trade equi-
librium. For example, if the firm can earn nonnegative profits by paying
efficiency wages, then it could be that the punishment is merely for workers
to not accept any contract with bonding but to allow the firm to operate
using efficiency wages. The impact of such a milder punishment is that the
right hand side of condition (7) becomes Tr/Le , where it is the per period
profit in the punishment equilibrium. This will have no impact on the
argument that the equilibrium contract is a full bonding contract, but
because the NEC is made tighter when the punishment is weaker, equilibrium
firm scale may be reduced.
14
The reason why the NEC is made weaker when s > is as follows. Each
worker hired by the firm must be paid his reservation wage plus an increment
with expected discounted present value which, in conjunction with the
performance bond, is sufficient to deter the worker from shirking. When the
firm has labor turnover, the expected discounted number of workers hired per
job is (l+r)/( 1+r-s) > 1. Thus, the total discounted present value cost per
job in excess of the worker's reservation wage is the product of the
expected discounted present value of the wage increment and (l+r)/( 1+r-s).
It is this second factor which explains why the discounted present value of
the cost per job decreases by more than the increase in the value of the
bonds, when the firm shifts its contract away from efficiency wages and
towards performance bonds.
The equilibrium value of Le cannot lie on the rising portion of the
average product curve. Hence, there is a unique PBEE in this case.
There is another reason, apart from simplicity, for assuming that the
unknown parameter is a multiplicative factor. As in Section II, we would
like the market to be able to observe L and f((l-k)L) in order to infer k
and thereby to detect whether the firm has expropriated any performance
level. Thus m is best interpreted as the firm's internal price of the
product.
The entry fee C(m) may be paid to workers employed in the first period
as a signing bonus. In this case the signing bonus per worker is
C(m)/L
1
(m).
1 8
It is assumed that all firms of the same type play the same strategy.
In our model, this is not a restrictive assumption.
19
The strategy space for each firm is the set of pairs of nonnegative
entry fees and nonnegative sequences of employment.
20
As suggested by Lazear (1981), deferred payments may be used Co provide
effort incentives for workers who approach the end of their job tenures.
Lazear, however, models the firm moral hazard problem by treating the cost of
expropriation on a per worker basis. These costs are exogenously specified
and vary across firms. Lazear does not link these costs to the building of
firm reputations.
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21
As in the case of performance bonds discussed in section II, the NEC
is weakened by increasing the severance payment and lowering the constant
wage along the NSC, holding employment fixed. Thus, there is no reason for
firms to pay higher wages than w6 accompanied by a lower severance payment.
22
In this case the entry fee cannot be paid to workers since employment
is not observable.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 : The constraint set defined by (12i) and (12ii) is non-
empty since a defined in Lemma 1 is a feasible strategy. Since Tr(m,a(m))
is continuous in a(m) (we employ the sup norm topology on strategies) and
the left-hand sides of (12i) and (12ii) are continuous in the relevant
truncation of the strategy o"(m), each constraint delimiting the constraint
set is closed. Thus the constraint set itself is closed since it is the
intersection of closed sets. Since the present discounted value of profits
is bounded above by ( )(pf(L*)-w L*) we can restrict C(m), the entry fee,
to a bounded interval. Since the right-hand side of (12i) is bounded uni-
formly in m, we can restrict L (m) to a bounded interval. Then, applying
an inductive argument, we can restrict L (m) to a bounded interval, since
the right-hand side of (12ii) is uniformly bounded in m and since by the
t-1 pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
induction hypothesis, £ r—
:
C(m) is bounded below.
h=l (1+r)
Moreover, we can take this lower bound to be uniform since
t-1 pmf(L(m)) - w L(m)
,
pf (L*) - w L*
v h rh „, x , 1 . r,
k i 777^ (m) TTT^r [ * ] cannoth=l (1+r) (1+r)
optimal. Hence, we can take L (m) to be bounded above uniformly in t
and m. Thus there exists a bounded sequence of feasible strategies such
that the associated sequence of profits converges to the supremum of
profits over all feasible strategies. This bounded sequence of feasible
strategies necessarily has a convergent subsequence whose limit is feasible
and, by the continuity of the objective function in cr(m), must in fact be
optimal. II
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Proof of Lemma 3 : The constraints given by (12i) and (12ii) are the same
for each m. Take m < m . Then, p(m , z) = w(m ,<J*(m , z))
< it (m
2
,cf*(m
1
,z))
_< ti (m2 ,a*(m2 ,z)) =p(m2 ,z), where the first inequality
holds because tt is increasing in m and the second inequality holds because
a*(m ,z) is optimal for type m firms given z while a*(m ,z) is feasible.
mm Mm X
This shows p(z) is increasing in m.
Let m. = Xm + (1-X )m. where £ X
_< 1. Then, p(m,z) >_ i\(m ,o*(m. i z))
and P (m ,z) 2 ^ ( n»2 >a *(mx » z ))» Hence Xp(m ,z) + (l-X)p(m ,z)
2 XiT(m
1
,a*(m
x
,z)) + (1-X )tt (m2>a*(mx ,z')) = tt (mx ,a*(mx ,z)) =p(mx ,z). This
shows p(z) is convex in m.
Suppose p (m ,z) tt (m ,a*(m ,z)) > 0. Then for m near to but less than
c c c
*
m
,
Tr(m,a*(m ,z)) > as well. Thus by (9), Br L (m )
c c t t c
pmf (L. (m )) - w L (m )
n c r h c
< E r—
—
for all t and m near to but less than ra .
" h-t+1 (l+r)
h"C
Let L*(m) solve max pmf(L) - w L. Since Tr(m,a*(m ,z)) > it follows that
L>0
- £ £
L*(m) > L. Let L(m ) = sup L (m ). Since B L (m )
c t c F t c
* * -
00 pmf(L (m )) - w Is (m ) pmf(L*(m)) - w L*(m)
< I —-— ——~ < < B L*(m), it follows
h=t+l (1+r)
that L(m ) < L*(m) for m near to but less than m . Since
c — c
- * * _ _
praf(L, (m )) - w L, (m ) < pmf(L(m )) - w L(m ) for all h,he rhc — c re
^
pmf(L(m )) - w L(m ) p(m -ra)f(L(ra ))
B L (m ) < ~ < B^LCm ) . For t such
F t c — r — F c r
* _
that L (m ) is sufficiently close to L(m ) this is not possible. Hence
t c c
P (m ,z) = 0. II
c
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Proof of Theorem 1: Let L [ra ,1] be the set of all almost everywhere
c
bounded, measurable functions on [m ,1] endowed with the sup norm, i.e., for
f e L°°[m ,1], Ufll = inf{N: y{m: f(m) > N} = } where u is Lebesque
c °°
oo oo
measure. L [m ,1] is a Banach Space. Let Z[m ,1] = {z e L [m ,1]:
c c c
z is nondecreasing, convex, z(m ) = 0, and z(l)
_< ( )[pf(L*)-w L*]}.
Z [m ,1] is obviously a convex set. We will also show that it is closed
c
and sequentially compact in the sup norm topology. Since each
z e Z[m ,1] can be trivially extended to a function, z
,
defined on
e e[m,l] by requiring z (m) = for m < m and z (m) = z(m) for m > m , the
— c — c
function p composed with this extension function induces a map from
Z[m ,1] into itself: z p(z ). This map is continuous and hence by the
Bohnenblust and Karlin fixed point theorem (see Friedman (1977), p. 162)
this map has a fixed point.
We first show Z[m ,1] is closed. Let (z ) be a convergent sequence in
Z [m ,1] and let z be the pointwise limit of this sequence. Take
m < m, < m. < 1. Then since for each q, z (m, ) < z (nO, we have
c — 11— q 1 — q 2
z(m, ) = lim z (m. ) < lim z (m_) = z(m ). Hence z is nondecreasing. Now
1 ql — q22 °q+°o » q-»-a> ^
take m. = Am + (1-X )m„ with <_ X
_< 1. Again we have for each q
Xz (in ) + (l-X)z (m ) > z (m ). Hence Xz(m,) + (l-X)z(iO =ql q 2 — q X 1 2
X lim z (m.) + (1-X ) lira z (m ) = lim[Xz (m n )+(l-X)z (m )l >ql q2 ql q 2 —q-Hn q->-ao T q-»-co n n
lira z (nL ) = z(hl ). Hence z is convex. Since z (m ) = for all q,
q->.oo
"
°l c
lim z (m ) = z(ra ) = 0. Finally, since z (1) < (^-^) [pf (L*)-w L*]qc c q — r rq+oo ^ "»
for all q, lira z (1) = z(l) < (1±1) [ p f (l*)-w L*]. Thus Z[m ,1] is complete.
q — r r cq+co
Since Z[m ,1] is a complete subset of a metric space, it is closed (see
Royden, 1968, p. 138).
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Now we show Z[m ,1] is sequentially compact. Let M be a countable dense
c
subset of [m ,1] and order elements in M so that m. denotes the ith element
c 1
in M. Set m. 1. Consider an arbitrary sequence (z ) C Z[m ,1]. We are
1 q c
to show that (z ) necessarily has a convergent subsequence. Since
(z (m )) = (z (1)) is a bounded sequence in R , it necessarily has a con-
vergent subsequence by the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem. Then since every
subsequence of a convergent sequence converges, it follows by induction that
there exists a subsequence of (z ), denote this subsequence by (z ), such
that (z (m, )) converges for i = l,...,k, where we note that (z (m, )) and
hence any subsequence of (z (iV.)) is bounded. Since this is true for all
k, it follows that there is a subsequence of (z ), denote this subsequence
oo oo
by (z ), such that (z (m.)) converges for all m. £ M. Now take an arbitrary
q q l
° l
00
m £ [m ,1]. Then (z (m)) converges. To see this note that it is neces-
c q
00
sarily true for m = 1 since m, = 1. If m = m , then z (m ) = for all q
1 c q c
00
and consequently (z (m )) converges to 0. Finally, take m < m < 1 and let
q c c
00
z* be an accumulation point of (z (m)). Let (m. ) C M such that m. t m.
00 00 oo
Then since z (m ) _< z (m) fo each q and h, lim lim z (m. ) _< z*. Since
h h+°° q-*-°° h
oo i oo
tn
~mih
z is convex, z (m) < [- lz (m. ) + [-= ]z (1). Hence
q q l-mih q ih
l-mih q
1 —
m
OO X ft 00
z* < lim lim { [- ]z (m. ) + [- ]z (1)}. Thus z* is unique and
—
,
l~m-i, q i l"m-i, q
h->°° q>°° xh h 1h
00
(z (m)) converges.
To show that the composition of p with the extension function is con-
p
tinuous, take z
n
,z_ e Z[ra ,1] such that llz,-z_ll < £. Then if o*(m,z 1 )12c 1 2 °° 1
is altered by increasing the entry fee by £ without changing the employment
path, the resulting altered strategy satisfies all the constraints in (12)
e e e
for the profit assignment function z„. Thus p(m,z ) - £
_< p(m,z^).
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Similarly, p(m,z„) -e _<p(m,z ). This is true uniformly in m. Thus
llp(z^) - pCzpll < e. II
Proof of Lemma 4 ; Since a* is a Nash equilibrium, a*(m) = ir(m,a*(m))
- X
>ir(m,a*(m)) for all m,m e [m ,1]. It follows that given a*, a (a*(m))
— c
satisfies (I2i) and satisfies (12ii) for t = 2,...,T, since a(m) satisfies
T
these constraints and a (a*(m)) coincides with a*(m) over these periods.
If pmf(L*(m)) - w L_(m) > rB L*(m), then for t > T
l r i — t l
t pmf(lj(0*(m))) - w lj(a*(m)) B L*(m)
.
E S
. ;
F
+ \. i l^U,a (a*(m))) (see
h=l (1+r) * (1+r)
equation (9) and the prior discussion). While if
~ * * *
pmf(L
T
(m)) - w
r
L
T
(m) < rB^Cm), then for t > T
t pmf(L^(a*(m))) - w
r
I^(a*(m)) B
p
L*(m) T pmf (L*(m)) - w^Cm)
)
h=l (l+r)*1
"1 (l+r) 11
"1 h=l (l+r)h_1
B L*(m)
.
+
=37 <. a *(m). Hence, a (a*(m)) satisfies (12i) and (12ii). II
(l+r) 1
"1
Proof of Lemma 5 : Since ir(m,a*(m)) = a*(m), it follows that
k
°° pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
B L (m)
_< I r—— for each t (again see equation (9)
*
C h=t+l (1+r)
and the prior discussion). There are two cases to consider. First,
L*(m) < argmax pmf(L) - w L. Then L*(m) satisfies pmf (L*(m)) - w L*(m) =
L
rB L*(m). It is straightforward Co show that in this case
r
£ £ A * A
pmf(L (m)) - w L (m))
_> rB L (m) when L (m) _> L. The argument is the same
as the one given in the proof of Lemma 3 to show p(m ,z) = 0. Hence
c
*
L (m) <_ L*(m) is immediate in this case. Second, L*(m) = argmax pmf(L) -
L
w L. In this case, if L (m) > L*(m) for any T, then an alternate feasible
strategy can be constructed with the same entry fee and same employment
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levels for the first T - 1 periods and with stationary employment equal
to L*(m) in all subsequent periods. The feasibility of this alternate
strategy follows from the same argument as given in the proof of Lemma 4,
*
by noting that in lowering employment in period T from £T (m) to L*(m) the
period T constraints in (12ii) are all weakened. Since this alternate
strategy yields greater profits than a*(m), a*(m) could not be a best
response to a*. This is a contradiction. II
Proof of Theorem 2 : Without loss of generality take m
_< m < m _< 1. Given
a*(m), we will construct an alternate feasible strategy which provides a
type m firm with less profit than a*(m) and provides a type m firm with
greater profit than a*(m).
*
When m = m if c*(m ) = L (m ) = for all t, the result is trivial
c etc
since the strategy a , defined in Lemma 1, is feasible and gives the type m
firm greater profits than it would earn by staying out.
Having dispensed with this case we assume without loss of generality
that pmf(L (m)) - w L (m) > infinitely often, by invoking Lemma 4 if
t r t
necessary. In each period where profits are positive, the shape of the
*
production function and Lemma 5 imply that pmf '(L (m)) - w >_ 0. Denote
the first such period at t , the second such period as t , etc. We con-
struct the alternate strategy as follows. Denote the alternate strategy by
°
a
= (C
a
,(La )). Then Ca = C*(m) + dC + e, where dC and e are both positive
but small, e is further specified below. If pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
_< 0,
then L = L (m). If not, then L = L (m) + dL where dL is defined
t t t t t t
q q q q
inductively by
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dL - m*r£: and
C
l [pmf '(L (m)) + B - w ]
1
r
q-1 t -I
dC - I. [pmf »(Lt,(m)) -w ]/dLt . (1+r)h=l *-h r ch
dL ; r— .
C
q [pmf '(L (m)) + B - w Kl+r) 1 Cq
z r r
q
Observe that by construction
q [p«f»(L£h(m)) -Wr]dLth BpdLtq
I rr~Z] + r _-.
= dC.
h-1 (1+r) h (1+r) q
j p
By a straightforward induction argument, < dL < =—• Hence,
* 1 F
- [pmf '(Lth (m)) - *J Lth
I — ; 1 11 = dC.
h=l (1+r) th-l
Let dm be defined by
dCdm =
inf [ I pmf(L*(m))/(l+r)
h t
]
t h=t+l
For m > m + dm we have
00 pmf(L } - w L « praf(L (m)) - w L (m)
1 * LA > E h r h
h=t+l (l+r) h C h=t+l (1+r) 11
"
11
pmf(L (m)) - w L. (ra)
> S " ^T^ + dC2Bp [L (m) +^] > B LV
h=t+l (l+r) h t F C BF ~ F t
dC,
. „ T a
Thus, no such firm will expropriate bonds under this alternate policy. If
E is set so that Z pdmf '(L (m))dL /(1+r) n = e, then it follows that
h-1 Z h lh
for all m <! m + dm and for all q,
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q [pmf(L* (m)) -w ]dU BdLt
Z ^ r-^- ±+ F <* <
h-1 (l+r) th X (l+r) Cq l
*
q pdmf'(Lt (m))dLt
£ — + dC = e + dC.
h-1 (l+r) th
Hence, the alternate policy is feasible.
Finally, note that the change in profits for a type m firm in adopting
the alternate policy is
- [pmf '(L* (m)) - w ]dL
Z - [dC4€ J - -€ <
h=0 (l+r) th
while the change in profits for a type m in adopting the alternate policy is
- [pmf f (L*. (m)) - wJdLt ,
Z -
. -
C
- [dC4€ ] =
h=0 (l+r) Ch x
- p(m-m)f '(L*. (m))dLt .
-
L h L h v nZ ——: e > 0,
h=0 (l+rrh X
as long as m - m > dm. II
Proof of Theorem 3: Tr(m,o*(m)) > ir(m,a) and ir(m ,o) > Tr(m ,a*(m)) since
— c — c
a* is a Nash equilibrium. These inequalities imply that
r n f \
f(L*(m))
s - . v
f(L)
l pCm-m ) —j- >_ L p(m-m ) —r •
t-1
C (1+rr" 1 t-1 C (1+r)
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Hence L*(m) = sup(L (m)) > L. From Lemma 4, it follows that
* * * *
00 pmf(LL (m)) - w L, (m) pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
_ h r h v t r t
h-t+l" (l+r) h_t
for all t. In fact,
* * * *
00 pmf (L (m)) - w L, (m) pmf(L (m)) - w L (m)
_
h r h s r r r t ,E — >_ max I ]
h=t+l (1+r) " T<t
since
00
XX XX
pmf(L(m)) - w LyCm) t pmf(L(m)) - w U(m)
I Li 1-11 = I
h^r (1+r) h=r (1+r)
X X
.
°° pmf (L (m)) - w L (m)
+ i z
h r h
(l+r) t^ h=t+l (l+r) h C
Let t be the smallest t such that L (m) >^T. If T*(m) < L*(m) then it
follows that there exists an m, ra < m < m, such that
c
ft
°° pmf(L (m)) - w L. (m)
B
F
L(n.) < I r—^
t
h-t+l (l+r)
h C
for all t >^ t • Hence, there exists an alternate feasible strategy which
yields greater profits for a type m firm than o*(m). The argument is the
same as the one given in the proof of Theorem 2. Thus L*(m) = L*(m).
X
We must show that L*(m) is the only accumulation point of (L (m)).
Since
-48-
°° pmf (L,(m) ) - w L, (m)
I ^—
r^
(l+r) h Z
* *
:-{(TT") [pmf(L (m)) -wL ..()] + (—") [pmf(L*(m)) -wL*(m)]}
— r ±+r u+i r t+i l+r r
it follows from the results of the previous paragraph that
max [pmf(L*(m)) - w L*(m)] - [pmf(L* ) - w L* (m)]
_<
-{pmf(L*(m)) -wL*(m)] -max [pmf(L*(m)) -wL*(m)]}.
r
t <t
T r T
Since the right-hand side of this inequality converges to as t goes to
infinity, it follows that there is a unique accumulation point of
(L*(m)). II


